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Victims' Rights Reform-Where Do We Go from Here?
More than a Modest Proposal
Glenn A. Fait*
I. INTRODUCTION

It is hard to believe that over twenty years have passed since the Rose Garden
ceremony at the White house, where President Reagan accepted the final report from
his Task Force on Victims of Crime.'The report contained a number of modest
recommendations for improving the lot of crime victims in the criminal justice
process, including providing a separate courthouse waiting room for victims,
training judges concerning victims' needs and interests, and allowing victims to be
on-call as witnesses.2 The report also recommended that victims of violent crimes be
given the right to provide input during the sentencing phase of the trial.3 Although
this right to allocution during sentencing has now become a standard component of
criminal trials in most jurisdictions, at the time it was viewed as a radical proposal
that might seriously damage the integrity of the criminal justice process. This
innovation was opposed not only by defense attorneys and judges but also by many
district attorneys, who saw it as an erosion of their discretion to control the
prosecution of criminals. After all, they argued, it was the people's interest, not the
interest of the actual victim, that was being advanced by the prosecution of
criminals. In retrospect, what seemed to be radical proposals that would corrupt the
criminal justice process now seem to be mere nibbling around the edges of a process
that is of significant importance to victims of crime.
During the past twenty years, there have been proposals for even more
significant involvement of victims in the criminal justice process. For example,
Professor George P. Fletcher has suggested that victims be given the right to crossexamine witnesses during the actual criminal trial and the right to veto plea
bargains; both help ensure that "the purpose of the trial is to stand by the victim. ' In
his critique of Professor Fletcher's book, Professor Stephen J. Schulhofer responds
to this premise as follows:
The point that needs to be made first here is that the purpose of the criminal
trial is not to stand by the victim. The purpose of the trial is to determine
whether the defendant is factually and legally responsible for an offense.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has sometimes implied that this truthdetermining function should be virtually the sole task of the criminal trial.
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Presently, our society remains committed to a small number of devices that
can sometimes interfere (mostly in modest ways) with the primary truthseeking function of the trial. But we remain acutely aware of the costs of
procedural rules that serve goals other than determining the truth, and we
are rightly suspicious of efforts to burden our trial process by adding more
rules of that sort.5
Most crime victims would certainly agree with Professor Schulhofer's conclusion
that the primary purpose of the criminal trial should be to determine the truth.
However, after twenty-five years of serving the interests of crime victims, I am
convinced that most crime victims do not believe that the current criminal justice
system does a good job of determining the truth. Few crime victims would agree
with Professor Schulhofer's assertion that there are merely "a small number of
devices that can sometimes interfere (mostly in modest ways) with the primary
truth-seeking function of the trial."6 Moreover, even though Professor Schulhofer
seems to applaud the ability of our current criminal justice process to ascertain the
truth, he later acknowledges that "[o]nly the most determined Polyanna or bar
association cheerleader can continue to lavish unbridled praise on modem America's
criminal trial system."7 It is likely that if the current criminal justice system could
establish the truth, crime victims would not be so eager to force themselves directly
into that process. Although it is highly unlikely that crime victims want the wrong
persons convicted of the crimes perpetrated against them, they nevertheless have the
most direct interest in ensuring that the criminal justice system does not get in the
way of establishing the guilt of the persons who in fact committed the crimes. Most
victims believe in due process and the rights of the accused. In fact, it is some of
those same basic rights that victims want for themselves.
Now I turn to "more than a modest proposal." I propose that a new Victims of
Crime Task Force be empanelled to study the current criminal justice system. The
Task Force should engage in a top-to-bottom review and should make recommendations
concerning modifications to the criminal justice system that would strengthen its
truth-seeking function. It should closely and critically study any part of the criminal
justice system that hinders the search for truth.
In performing the recommended review, the new Task Force could learn much
from the approaches used in the field of administrative adjudication. I spent the last
thirty years focused on administrative adjudication by training adjudicators, consulting
with administrative agencies, and administering hearing systems. Although many who
practice in the courts may find impertinent the suggestion that the courts might learn
something of value from the way administrative adjudicators approach their
responsibilities, the reality is that the procedures used in administrative adjudication
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are in many respects better designed to arrive at the truth than the procedures used in
courts. Most appropriate to a study by the Task Force in examining the court's truthseeking function would be the application of the exclusionary rule, the traditional
rules of evidence, various privileges, and the role of the adjudicator.

II. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
It would have been hard to convince the relatives of the three women murdered
at Yosemite that the criminal justice system was concerned with seeking the truth
had the court excluded Cary Stayner' s confession because of some technical errors
made by the police while informing him of his rights. Although Stayner's confession
was ultimately not suppressed, the mere thought that such evidence could be hidden
from ajury is enough to cause crime victims to lose their faith in the criminal justice
system. It is not novel to suggest that the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule be
reassessed. That debate has raged for years, with those defending it asserting that to
eliminate the rule would be an attack on the integrity of the Fourth Amendment and
that only the exclusionary rule can protect the constitutional provision against
unlawful search and seizure. However, the undisputed fact is that the application of
the exclusionary rule does get in the way of ascertaining the truth and not merely in
a "modest way," as Professor Schulhofer contends.8
In the area of administrative adjudication, the courts recognized how seriously
the application of the exclusionary rule would interfere with the truth-seeking role of
the administrative tribunal and therefore concluded that the truth-seeking function of
the administrative tribunal was more important than the limited deterrence that
would have occurred from application of the exclusionary rule.9 Why is the need for
ascertaining the truth not of equal importance in deciding whether a person is guilty
of committing a crime?
By attacking the use of the exclusionary rule, I am in no way implying that legal
authorities should be allowed to violate the constitutional rights of citizens, whether
innocent or guilty. Rather, the cause for concern is the ineffectiveness of the
exclusionary rule in providing appropriate deterrence to law enforcement misconduct,
especially in relation to innocent citizens. The only justification for a rule that so
egregiously interferes with the truth-seeking purpose of a criminal trial is that it does
an effective job of protecting all citizens against misconduct by the police.
When innocent citizens have their rights violated by the authorities, they have
the right to complain and attempt to seek civil damages. When guilty criminals have
their rights violated, they too can complain and seek civil damages, but they may
also be entitled to a get-out-of-jail-free card through the application of the
exclusionary rule.

8.
9.

Id. at 840.
See, e.g., In re Martinez, I Cal. 3d 641 (1970); Governing Bd. v. Metcalf, 36 Cal. App. 3d 546 (1974).
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I am unaware of any evidence that the exclusionary rule is truly effective in
protecting the rights of all citizens. Perhaps the Task Force should not only address
the efficacy of the exclusionary rule, but it should also explore more effective ways
of providing real deterrence to police misconduct without interfering with the
primary truth-seeking function of the criminal trial.
Here again, administrative adjudication may provide a possible effective alternative.
States could create an administrative tribunal that would do nothing but adjudicate
the issue of whether public authorities have violated the constitutional rights of
citizens. In those cases in which violations are found, the tribunal would be
empowered to assess damages against both the public agency and the public officials
involved. Such a tribunal would gain special expertise in evaluating such claims and
would provide insulation from the kind of emotional pro-police responses to which a
jury might be vulnerable. The decisions of the administrative tribunal would of
course be subject to appeal to the appropriate courts, but the court's review of the
facts should be limited by use of a substantial evidence standard of review. Such an
approach would provide equal access to an appropriate remedy for police
misconduct to both law-abiders and law-breakers.
If such an administrative enforcement approach were coupled with an attempt,
by statute or amendment of a state constitution, to eliminate the exclusionary rule, it
is likely that the Supreme Court would take a fresh look at the constitutional
necessity of the exclusionary rule.

1II.

RULES OF EVIDENCE

A wise man once stated:
The Anglo-Saxon law of evidence may be compared to a soundly rooted
and once symmetrical tree which in the course of years has become
lopsided, full of dry rot and so entangled with vines and creepers that it not
only obscures the light but it is impossible to tell which are branches and
which are parasites.'0
Application of the rules of evidence can also interfere with the truth-seeking
function of the criminal justice process.
What most poignantly distinguishes administrative hearings from court trials is
that administrative hearings are not bound by the "formal" rules of evidence. For
instance, hearsay evidence is admissible in most administrative hearings. In one
decision, a court stated:
The notion that hearsay should be admitted and given its natural probative
effect is no longer novel. It is one of the principal distinguishing features of
administrative procedure. The desire to escape from the rigidity of common

10.
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law rules of evidence, often highly technical, with the expense, inconvenience
and delay entailed in adhering thereto and the inability of the courts to
expeditiously dispose of controversies arising under regulatory statutes, led
to the creation of a multitude of administrative tribunals which are rapidly
preempting a field once considered to be the exclusive domain of the courts.
Whatever may be their shortcomings, it does not appear that the liberalization
of the rules of evidence is one of them."
The hearsay rule is anachronistic and often interferes with getting at the truth.
The O.J. Simpson murder case is a good example of how the hearsay rule got in the
way of the jury's having the necessary evidence to ascertain the truth. Applying the
hearsay rule, the judge excluded portions of the victim's diary that recorded
instances of domestic abuse. That information might have been helpful to the jury in
trying to determine whether the defendant had a propensity for violence. The
exclusion of this evidence caused such an uproar that a new exception to the hearsay
rule was enacted by California's Legislature relating to diaries of domestic abuse
victims.12

Rather than eroding the hearsay rule with adhoc measures based upon individual
cases, the new Task Force should take a hard look at the hearsay rule itself. Rather
than complex and rigid rules that attempt to anticipate the value of all future
evidence of a certain kind, why not enact a rule that allows the judge in his or her
discretion to exclude evidence based upon an examination of that evidence in the
light of the specific case? Such an examination would be based upon such factors as
relevance, reliability, cumulativeness, and possible prejudicial effect. Using such a
standard of discretion, a judge could determine on a case-by-case basis whether a
specific piece of evidence would assist or interfere with the jury's determination of
the truth of what occurred. As an alternative to excluding evidence, a judge could
decide to admit problematic evidence with appropriate instructions to the jury on
how to evaluate the evidence.
The Task Force should review all of the formal rules of evidence to determine
whether there are better ways of controlling the introduction of inappropriate
evidence while at the same time not concealing important information that would
assist the fact finder in ascertaining the truth.
IV. PRIVILEGES

The new Victims of Crime Task Force should also take a close look at all
privileges. The number of communications subject to privileges continues to grow.
By their very nature, privileges are obstacles to ascertaining the truth. That is not to
say that all privileges should be eliminated, but the Task Force should take a fresh
11.
12.

Oceanic Fisheries Co. v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 109 F. Supp. 103, 104 (1953).
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370 (West Supp. 2002).
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look at them to determine whether the interests being protected by a specific
privilege are, in fact, weighty enough to justify its use in concealing otherwise
valuable evidence. Additionally, the Task Force should address whether some
privileges should be "qualified" rather than "absolute." If a privilege is qualified, the
judge can review the content of the privileged communication in camera, in the
context of the specific case, and determine whether the values being promoted by
the privilege are outweighed by the need for the evidence in making an accurate
determination of the truth.
By questioning the value of privileges, I run the risk of alienating victim
advocates urging the creation of a privilege for victims' counselors. But whether a
new privilege for victims' counselors should be created and whether it should be
absolute or qualified should be guided by a balancing of the value of protecting the
communication with the need for the information in arriving at the truth. The same
test should be used in analyzing all privileges.
The new Task Force should also address the question of why a jury or a judge
should not be allowed to draw an adverse inference from the refusal of a criminal
defendant to testify in his or her defense. California Supreme Court's Chief Justice,
Roger Traynor, a leading liberal jurist of the 1960s, stated:
[I]t cannot be overemphasized that whether or not the court or prosecutor
comments on the defendant's failure to testify, the jury will draw adverse
inferences therefrom. It will expect the defendant to present all the evidence
he can to escape conviction, and it will naturally infer that his failure to
explain or deny evidence against him when the facts are peculiarly within
his knowledge arises from his inability to do so. "Such an inference is
natural and irresistible. It 3 will be drawn by honest jurymen and no
instruction will prevent it."'
Why should courts continue to be required to preclude prosecutors from commenting
upon and juries from using the failure of a defendant to testify in his or her defense?
In relation to an administrative hearing, the United States Supreme Court held
that prison authorities could draw an adverse inference from the prisoner's refusal to
testify during a prison disciplinary hearing.'4 If truth seeking is the primary purpose
of a criminal trial, why should an adjudicator be precluded from making logical
inferences from a defendant's refusal to testify?
V. ROLE OF THE JUDGE

The new Task Force should also address the role of the judge in our criminal
justice process. If seeking the truth is the primary purpose of criminal trials, why is
the role of the judge limited to that of an umpire? Judges supposedly are the most

13.
14.
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intelligent, skilled, and experienced legal professionals in the process; nevertheless
we do not allow them to actively participate in developing the record.
The role of the adjudicator marks another significant difference between most
administrative hearings and court trials. In many administrative hearings, the
adversary hearing model of seeking justice simply will not work. In some hearings,
one party to the dispute is not even present during the hearing. 5 In other cases, only
one side is represented. In many administrative hearings, non-attorney advocates of
varying degrees of competence attempt to represent parties. Administrative adjudicators
cannot count on all necessary evidence being adduced by competent'advocates on
both sides. The adjudicators are therefore required to play an active role in
developing the evidence necessary to make the correct rulings. Justice Brennan
referred to this approach as the administrative adjudicator's "duty of inquiry. ' ' 6
Similarly, the Institute for Administrative Justice at McGeorge School of Law
has taught thousands of administrative adjudicators to use what it calls the 'rulh
seeker" model of adjudication. The "truth seeker" model applies to all administrative
adjudications no matter what the level of representation. If neither party is represented
by an attorney, the adjudicator has an affirmative duty to develop the evidence that
he or she will need to make the correct decision. If both sides are represented by
attorneys, the degree of active participation by the adjudicator is reduced, but not
totally eliminated. If the attorneys fail to ask an important question of a witness, the
adjudicator is expected to ask the question. If a crucial witness is not called by the
attorneys, the adjudicator is expected to call the witness. In this way, it is hoped that
the adjudicator can remedy any shortcomings of the adversary hearing approach on a
case-by-case basis.
In the author's experience, the level of representation in many criminal trials
falls short of that necessary to ensure the complete development of the evidence.
Overworked district attorneys and public defenders with impossible case loads
cannot provide the kind of representation necessary, under the adversary hearing
model, to develop a full and complete record upon which to determine the truth.
Why not empower the judge in a criminal trial to do what is regularly expected of
administrative adjudicators: to ask questions and take other measures necessary to
produce a record from which truth can be divined. Of course, as with the
administrative adjudicator, the judge must be required not to advocate for either
side, but merely to develop the information necessary to make an informed decision.
California law provides hearing officers who conduct special education hearings
with certain enumerated powers that they can exercise to ensure the development of
a complete record upon which to base a decision." Similar express powers could be
15. The agency that conducts more hearings than any other in the United States is the Social Security
Administration. Normally, no one appears in Social Security hearings to represent the agency's initial decision.
Typically, only the administrative law judge, the claimant, and, in some cases, the claimant's representative appear at
the hearings.
16. Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 471 (1983) (Brennan J., concurring).
17. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56505.1 (West Supp. 2002).
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granted to judges in criminal trials. The powers given the hearing officer apply
whether the parties are equally represented or not. These powers are explained in the
subsections that follow.
A.

Question Witnesses

While it is common practice for administrative adjudicators to ask questions of
witnesses after questioning by the parties or their representatives, the law in
California was amended to provide that the hearing officer can ask questions before
anyone else has." In Social Security hearings, the administrative law judge or
hearing officer typically asks his or her questions before anyone else, including
cases in which the claimant is represented. This approach is especially important
where the parties or their representatives do not know how to ask questions or are
not sure what is or is not relevant. Many adjudicators who use this practice believe
that it makes for a much more orderly and complete record.
It has been the author's experience that even when both sides of a dispute are
well represented, sometimes neither attorney will ask a key question of the witness.
One may know that the answer to the question will be contrary to the interests of his
or her client, and the other attorney may not be sure of the answer and is therefore
hesitant to ask the question. In such a case, it is expected that the hearing adjudicator
will ask the key question, not because the adjudicator is trying to advance the cause
of either side, but because an answer to the question is necessary in getting at the
truth.
Our criminal trials should be more than games. If a question needs to be asked
and answered to determine the truth and neither side asks the question, the judge
should do so. 9 The alternative is to possibly lead the jury to an incorrect conclusion.
Some would insist that the remedy for a representative's failure to ask a key question
is a malpractice lawsuit by the injured party against the negligent attorney. Is that
really a satisfactory remedy? Criminal defendants often have difficulty suing their
attorneys, and victims of crime would not have standing to sue a derelict district
attorney for malpractice. Why not expect the best qualified, most neutral person in
the trial-the judge-to ask appropriate questions in order to develop a complete
record upon which a correct judgment can be rendered? Of course, there are hazards
to having judges ask questions. However, if judges are properly trained and
conditioned not to ask leading questions and not to inadvertently send inappropriate
messages to the jury, increasing the involvement of the judge in questioning
witnesses can increase the likelihood that jury or the judge will arrive at the truth.

18. ld. § 56505.1(a).
19. It is interesting to note that one of the criminal justice reforms urged by Professor Fletcher was to allow
the members of the jury to submit questions to the judge. If the judge felt the questions were appropriate, he would
ask the question of the witness. While this sounds like a valid method of expanding the truth-seeking nature of the
criminal trial, why not let thejudge ask questions on his or her own when the question is necessary in the search for
the truth'? See FLETCHER, supra note 4, at 253-54.
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B.

Call Witnesses

The law in California allows special education hearing officers to call witnesses
who they believe will assist them in arriving at the truth. 20 In the adversarial process,
sometimes neither side wants to call a particular witness who may have critical
information. On occasion, in special education hearings, neither side calls as a
witness the student's teacher, the person who has had more experience with the child
in an educational setting than anyone else. The school authorities may be afraid that
the teacher will not completely support their position, while the parents may see the
teacher as an adverse witness who might provide testimony damaging to their
position. The result under the strict adversary hearing model would be a decision
rendered in the absence of some of the best evidence available. In the "truth seeker"
model of adjudication, the hearing officer can request, or even subpoena, the teacher as
a witness. Surely, the same thing happens in criminal trials: an important witness is
not called by either side for what both sides think are good reasons. Why shouldn't
judges be given the authority and responsibility to call and question such witnesses
when necessary to facilitate their search for the truth?
C. Order Independent Evaluations
In special education hearings in California, most disputes involve conflicting
expert opinions (usually of psychologists) concerning the child's disability, its affect
on the child's ability to learn, and the appropriate educational program for the child.
Under California law, the special education hearing officer has the authority to order
an independent evaluation of the child when the hearing officer believes that the
evaluations performed by the parties were not appropriate or complete. 2' The hearing
officer may then call the independent expert as a witness in the hearing.
It is not uncommon for a judge in a criminal trial to order an independent
evaluation of a defendant pleading not guilty by reason of insanity. 2 Why not
broaden the authority of the court to order independent evaluations under any
circumstances in which the judge believes that such an evaluation will assist the jury
or court in ascertaining the truth concerning a matter that requires the testimony of
an expert witness?
D. Order the Experts to Talk to Each Other
One of the most innovative powers given to special education hearing officers is
the authority to require the competing experts to discuss the case with each other on

20.

CAL EDUC. CODE § 56505.1(d).

21.

Id. § 56505.1(e).

22.

CAL. PEN. CODE § 1027 (West 1985).
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the record. 23 This approach can be used to supplement the traditional way of
separately questioning each expert witness or can be used as an alternative. In many
cases, the experts' opinions concerning a child are so different that the hearing
officer wonders if the experts are talking about the same child. But most experts
subscribe to certain professional standards that provide a framework for arriving at
accurate expert opinions. In my experience, having the experts talk to each other on
the record has resulted in one of two outcomes. In some cases, the experts will
gradually move toward a consensus as they discuss with each other their separate
approaches to reaching their opinions. While the experts may not reach complete
agreement, the adjudicator at least has a better idea of the basis for the remaining
differences. In other cases, one or both experts appear to be unwilling to even
consider the validity of any opinion but their own. They appear to be "hired guns"
who were retained as witnesses to provide specific testimony rather than to
formulate a true, impartial professional opinion. With either outcome, the exchange
between the competing experts can be quite helpful to the hearing officer in arriving
at the correct decision.
The examples above identify just some of the innovative ways that our criminal
justice system can be modified to achieve the accepted goal of the process-to get at
the truth.
VI. VICTIMS INVOLVEMENT IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS
As mentioned earlier, there have been a number of proposals over the years to
provide victims with rights to participate in various aspects of the criminal justice
process, from allocution at sentencing to active involvement in the guilt phase of the
criminal trial. The new Victims of Crime Task Force should analyze these proposals
in the same way that it should examine all current elements of the criminal justice
process. Each element or proposal should be classified in one of three categories that
follow.
A. Procedures that Advance the Search for Truth
If it is concluded that an existing or proposed procedure advances the search for
truth in the criminal justice process, the Task Force should recommend that the
procedure be included in the reformed criminal justice process unless there are
substantial reasons militating against its inclusion. For instance, if a procedure is
deemed to advance the cause of truth in a minimal way but its inclusion would
consume an enormous amount of time, it might not be appropriate to recommend its
inclusion. However, if the procedure provides substantial assistance in the search for
truth, its shortcomings must be significant to exclude it from the proposed system.

23.

See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56505.1 (b) (requiring the consent of both parties prior to the discussion between
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Proceduresthat Inhibit the Searchfor Truth

If a procedure is deemed to inhibit the search for truth, it should presumptively
be excluded from the criminal justice system unless its inclusion is supported by a
significant countervailing public policy. Again, the degree that a procedure inhibits
the search for truth must be weighed against the importance of the public policy
supporting its inclusion.
C. Proceduresthat NeitherAdvance Nor Inhibit the Searchfor Truth
If a procedure has no effect one way or the other on the truth-seeking goal of the
criminal justice process, its inclusion or exclusion should be determined by
balancing the benefit and the burden of its inclusion. This is important because some
of the proposals relating to victims' participation in the criminal justice process may
be justified because they benefit the victim, not because they have a significant
effect, either positively of negatively, in arriving at the truth. A similar problem can
be found in the right of the victim to be heard at the time of sentencing. The exercise
of this right may provide little assistance to the court in determining the truth, but it
may provide great benefits to the individual victim. Therefore, unless the right to
allocution causes a significant burden on the criminal justice process, it should be
retained in the Task Force recommendations for reform of that process.
VII. CONCLUSION
While this presentation has only scratched the surface, the new Victims of Crime
Task Force should look at all elements of the criminal justice process and make
recommendations that, if adopted, would enhance the likelihood that truth would be
the end product of the criminal trial. The Task Force should then make its findings
available to all policymakers, both state and national, and assist them in pursuing those
recommendations. Some recommendations may necessitate a change of federal or state
statute, and some may require amendments to federal or state constitutions. Many, if
not most of the recommendations, will most likely be opposed by judges, criminal
defense attorneys, and maybe even prosecutors. But one of the benefits of the
development of the victims' rights movement is that there is now a powerful
constituency for those most directly affected by crime-the victims. And even if crime
victims find it hard to persuade Congress or state legislatures, there are always states
like California, which has been a pioneer in the field of victims' rights where the
people have the right through initiatives to directly enact changes to the law or
amendments to the Constitution.

